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ABSTRACT

The present research examined the developing awareness in children that one's emotional state need not correspond to how one appears expressively to others. Descriptive data were collected on children's own views about emotion management in interpersonal conflict scenarios and in general hypothetical situations. All of the child variables provide information about children's preinteraction expectancies from the standpoint of emotion management. Developmental differentiation in the children's data was examined by coding three qualitative variables according to ordinal ranks of complexity. Remaining variables were coded according to nominal categories. Specific category variables studied were (1) justification for emotion management in hypothetical conflict scenarios, (2) interpersonal consequences for emotion management, (3) preference for either peers or adults as targets for genuine displays of emotion, and rationale for preference, and (4) a rationale for an adaptive "balance" in showing or not showing one's genuine feelings to another. Instruments used to collect data included the newly-developed Parent Attitude toward Children's Expressiveness Scale, Snyder's Self-Monitoring Scale (1974), and Moos' Family Environment Scale (1974). A total of 32 children in three groups with mean ages of 7.9, 10.8, and 13.8 years and 52 of their parents participated. (RH)

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DEVELOPMENTAL RELATIONS BETWEEN EMOTION MANAGEMENT AND SOCIAL CONTROL

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DEVELOPMENTAL RELATIONS BETWEEN EMOTION MANAGEMENT AND SOCIAL CONTROL

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The present research examined the developing awareness in children that how one feels internally (i.e., emotional state) need not correspond to how one appears expressively to others, and, indeed, this dissociation between expressive behavior and emotional state can be quite deliberate on the part of the child. The interpretive perspective taken is that this emerging behavior constitutes an implicit strategy for influencing others' reponse to oneself. Such an implicit strategy presumes that children acquire preinteraction expectancies about (1) how others might possibly react to them, as well as (2) how they might manage their self-presentation in such a way so as to influence the anticipated response from another. The seemingly simple two-step process quickly becomes a complex dance of mutual anticipation and maneuvers to influence the stream of interaction. This process has been aptly labeled as negotiation by Dunn (1985) in her work with young children in family contexts and by Hinde (1985) in his ethological analysis of signaling behavior.

When children strategically manage their expressive display of emotion (hereafter referred to as emotion management), they are most often attempting to influence another's behavior, particularly the other's response to themselves. (The one area of regulated expressiveness that seems more intrapsychic rather than interpersonal may be when a child modifies her/his expressive behavior so as to cope with an uncomfortable emotional state without regard for any social

context; see Saarni, 1982.) Edinger and Patterson (1983) have defined such attempts at interpersonal influence as social control, which includes persuasion, dominance, giving evaluative feedback, deception, and impression management. Emotion management would appear to fall most readily under the rubric of impression management and deception, yet emotion management is clearly not always self-protective. Both Dunn's (1985) work and Gnepp's (1985) research show that children also manage their emotional-expressive displays for prosocial and empathic reasons.

Descriptive data were collected in the present research on children's own views about emotion management in interpersonal conflict scenarios and with reference to general hypothetical situations. All of the child variables provide information about children's preinteraction expectancies from the standpoint of emotion management. Developmental differentiation in the children's data was examined by coding three qualitative variables according to ordinal ranks of complexity. The remaining variables were coded according to nominal categories.

The specific category variables studied are as follows: (a) justification for emotion management in hypothetical conflict scenarios; (b) interpersonal consequences for emotion management, sub-divided according to specific conflict scenarios and general hypothetical situations; (c) preference for either peers or adults as targets for genuine displays of emotion, followed by a rationale for their choice; and (d) a rationale for an adaptive "balance" in showing or not showing one's genuine feelings to another in one's own managment of emotional expressiveness. Exploratory work was also undertaken with a newly-developed scale, the Parent Attitude toward Children's Expressiveness Scale, to investigate how children's conceptualizations as listed above might be related to the relative strictness or permissiveness espoused by parents toward

children's emotional-expressive behavior. To provide further information about individual differences in children's thinking, the parents also completed Snyder's Self-Monitoring Scale (1974) and Moos' Family Environment Scale (1974). These parent measures were applied in a regression analysis only to the three child variables which had been scaled ordinally (i.e., justification, consequences, and balance).

METHOD

Sample: 32 children and their parents participated as subjects. Three age groups were represented: 1 = mean age 7.9 years; 2 = mean age 10.8 years; and 3 = mean age 13.8 years. Sex was fairly evenly distributed across the age groups. 52 parents participated: 44% fathers, 56% mothers (some children had only one parent participating).

The children were all native speakers of English, and socio-economic status was middle class. The children attended a liberal-humanistic parochial school in Berkeley, California. No children with special educational needs were included in the sample.

Children's Procedure: The children were seen individually at their school and interviewed using as stimuli four photographed scenarios of children involved in conflicts in which the target child in the scenario can respond with a facial expression that is discrepant from internal affect. These materials had been used in an earlier study (Saarni, 1979) and had yielded significant age differences in reasoning about the dissociation of affect and expressive behavior. The themes of the four scenarios were (a) being intercepted after pulling the school fire alarm, (b) being bullied, (c) receiving a disappointing gift, and (d) boasting about one's skating ability and then falling down. (For the sake of brevity, the reader is referred to the earlier publication for

further details.) The interview questions posed yielded the descriptive variables noted above, which are described more fully in the Results section.

Parents' Procedure: The parents individually responded to the author-developed questionnaire, Parent Attitude toward Children's Expressiveness Scale (see Table 1 for sample items from this scale; the full scale is available upon request, along with a scoring key and information about reliability and validity), Snyder's Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder, 1974), and to Moos' Family Environment Scale (Moos, 1974). The 20-item Parent Attitude Scale is intended to reflect an attitudinal dimension which ranges from permissive to restrictive in terms of how a respondent regards their child's emotional-expressive behavior. The response format is multiple choice, whereby the four options reflect the permissive-restrictive attitudinal dimension.

The other two parent measures are commonly used instruments in research. Their reliability is high, and their construct validity may be considered adequate, although challengeable.

RESULTS

Each of the child variables is presented below, first according to its descriptive coding system and then followed by relevant statistical outcomes.

I. Coding of 'Justification' for emotion management in specific scenarios.

For each of the four conflict scenarios the children were directly told that the target child in the scenario could adopt a facial expression that differed from how the child really felt. They were given four full-face portraits of the target child to choose from, which differed in expression. Critical for the justification variable was how they then responded to the question, "Why do you think she/he would want to look that way (pointing to their choice)?" This question was intended to elicit the children's reasoning for a justification of

expressive dissemblance or emotion management. The ranked categories developed in the 1979 study were again applied here; they are as follows:

1 = trouble-avoiding set, (e.g., "she doesn't want to get caught");

2 = qualifying factors of a relationship (e.g., "he doesn't want to hurt his aunt's feelings by showing he doesn't like the gift");

3 = maintenance of self-esteem (e.g., "she doesn't want to look dumb in the other girl's eyes");

4 = maintenance of system norms (e.g., "it's not polite to react that way").

Statistical results: The children's ranked justifications for each of the four scenarios were summed together to yield a final numerical index (range: 4 - 16). Table 2 contains the means and standard deviations for each age group and sex. An age x sex analysis of variance on this index revealed no significant sex difference, nor was the interaction of age x sex significant. However, age was a significant factor, $F(2,26) = 4.51$, $p < .02$. (Age correlated $r=.40$ with the summary justification index.) In the stepwise multiple regression analysis, in addition to age, Father's Self-Monitoring Scale (SMS) was also a significant contributor to this justification index; together child's age and father's SMS accounted for $R^2=.26$ of the variation in children's justification responses. Table 4 contains a summary of significant partial correlations between predictor variables and the child criterion variables.

II. Coding of 'Consequences' variables

Three variables are discussed under the heading of consequences; all three examine children's reasoning about the interpersonal sequelae of emotion management. The first one is in reference to the four specific conflict

scenarios; the other two refer to hypothetical conditions in the children's own lives.

The children's expectations about the interpersonal consequences for the target child's dissemblance in the four conflict scenarios were elicited by asking them, "What do you think the other child (or adult) in this story will think about this boy/girl if he/she covers up his/her feelings and looks different?" (The interviewer then pointed to the chosen portrait, or if the subject had been unable to choose a dissimulation, the inteviewer pointed to the neutral "poker face" expression, which was an option among all four sets of full-face portraits.) Their responses were coded according to the following ranked categories, which were developed to reflect increasing subtlety and perspective-taking:

A. Ranked categories for interpersonal consequences for specific scenarios:

1 = child says s/he does not know or gives a tangential response;

2 = child says there can be no dissemblance in expressive behavior, despite interviewer suggestions to the contrary;

3 = child contends that the facial expression adopted by the target child will not influence the interactant's reaction to the target child;

4 = child says that the target child's intent in dissembling is congruent with how the interactant interprets the facial expression (i.e., the target child is successful in achieving his/her purposes and is taken at 'face value' by the interactant);

5 = the child thinks that the interactant is likely to see past the dissemblance and realize that the target child's facial expression is a 'false front.'

Statistical results: The ranked category ratings that each child received for each of the four scenarios were again summed to yield a numerical index for this 'consequences' variable. Table 2 contains the means and standard deviations for each age group and sex. In an age x sex analysis of variance of this variable, age was again the only significant factor, $F(2,26) = 14.32$, $p < .01$. (Age correlated $r=.70$ with the summary index of interpersonal conseuqnces reasoning.) In the stepwise multiple regression, in addition to age, both father's Self-Monitoring Scale and Parent Attitude scores also contributed significantly, yielding a combined $R^2=.65$. Both regression coefficients were negative, suggesting that fathers espousing greater permissiveness toward children's expressiveness and less concern with personal self-monitoring were more likely to have children who demonstrated more complex thinking about the interpersonal consquences of emotion management.

B. Qualitative categories for children's response to "what do you think would happen to a child like yourself if she/he almost always showed to others how she/he really felt on the inside?"

This question was posed to the children after they had responded to all four scenarios. Their responses were empirically categorized as follows:
(In descending order of frequency of occurrence)

1 = 22%: they would have more friends and/or would be better liked;

2 = 19%: they would be teased, picked on, disliked, perceived as babyish or 'weird;'

3 = 14%: they could get into trouble;

4 = also 14%: they would be more vulnerable and get their feelings hurt more;

5 = also 14%: they might make others upset, hurt, or mad;

6 = 8%: they would elicit more help or concern;

7 = also 8%: they would be perceived as more trustworthy or honest;

8 = 3%: they would experience relief at being able to express their real feelings.

Statistical results: Only three children gave uncodable responses to this question. Cell sizes were too small to calculate chi-square values for age differences. However, none of the youngest children gave responses in categories 4 or 5, which emphasize emotional interaction. The older children appeared to be using in these two transactional categories double recursive loops in their thinking as well (e.g., for category 4, " if you show how scared about something you really are, then other kids would know that was your weak spot and could use that as a kind of power over you;" for category 5, "if you show you're feeling mad, you might make other kids not like you or not want to be around you, and if you showed it to your parents, they might get mad back at you"). Different emotions may also be involved in different categories, but the small sample size prohibited a meaningful analysis of that possibility.

C. Qualitative categories for children's responses to "what do you think would happen to a child like yourself if she/he almost never showed her/his real feelings to other people?"

This question was posed next and categorized again empirically.
(In descending order of frequency)

1 = 23%: they would be disliked, ignored, isolated, and/or have no friends;

2 = also 23%: they would be perceived as dishonest, untrustworthy, or unbelievable;

3 = 12%: they would not be understood or would be perceived as a 'mystery;'

4 = also 12%: they would feel sad or mixed up inside, not get any relief from expressing feelings, or get mad at people they were not really mad at;

5 = also 12%: they could avoid trouble, being picked on, or they could tolerate teasing;

6 = 7%: they would not be helped or get things;

7 = also 7%: they would get into trouble;

8 = 2%: they might feel guilty.

Statistical results: Only one of the youngest children could not generate a response to this question. Again cell sizes were too small to conduct a chi-square analysis for age; however there was no distinctive pattern in the three age groups' distribution across the categories.

For these two hypothetical questions it is noteworthy that, overall, 41% of the children's responses were positive or affirming for "almost always showing your real feelings" (59% cited negative consequences). The interpersonal consequences for "almost never showing your real feelings" were only 12% positive in tone (88% negative). This sample of children appears to believe that, despite the interpersonal risks, it is better to show one's real feelings than not to.

III. Preference for showing genuine feelings to either peers or adults

The children were next asked if they thought children like themselves (age and gender) would be more likely to show their real feelings to other 'kids' or to adults (other than parents).

A. 65% of the children thought children their age and gender would be more likely to show their real feelings to their peers; only the youngest boys were more likely to believe real feelings would be more often displayed to adults.

B. The children's rationales for their choice of peers or adults as targets of genuine emotional displays were first coded according to whether they cited (a) avoidance of a negative outcome or having a negative expectation as the basis for their choice, or (b) an expectation of a positive outcome for their choice.

Results: 63% of the responses cited negative outcomes or expectations; 37% cited positive expectations as the basis for their choice of peers or adults. This proportional majority of negative expectancies does suggest that defensive self-protection predominates as a motive for children's emotion management, at least toward adults.

C. Rationales based on negative expectations:

(In descending order of frequency)

1 = 40%: expectation of derision or teasing from peers;

2 = 30%: expectation of a negative emotional reaction from adults, i.e., anger, upsetness, hurt feelings, perception of the child as impolite;

3 = 20%: expectation of a coercive power response from adults, i.e., punishment;

4 = 10%: expectation of lack of understanding from adults.

D. Rationales based on positive expectations:

(In descending order of frequency)

1 = 50%: expectation of being understood by peers or being able to trust peers;

2 = 33%: expectation of being listened to and taken seriously by adults;

3 = 17%: expectation of eliciting symnpathy or help from adults.

IV. Rationale for an adaptive 'Balance' in showing/not showing genuine feelings:

This last variable examined children's beliefs or expectancies about how they personally 'decide' when to reveal their genuine feelings or not. Their responses to the question, "How do you figure out for yourself the balance between when to show your real feelings and when not to?" were coded according to subtlety, perspective-taking, recursive thinking, and the degree to which the response integrated both private and public self-awareness (see Buss, 1980). The ranked categories are as follows:

1 = child says s/he does not know or gives a tangential response;

2 = child cites a concrete instance in which s/he concealed her/his feelings but does not generalize (e.g., "once I fell off my bike and it hurt bad, but I didn't cry");

3 = child gives an unelaborated response that it depends on the situation, or they just use common sense as to when they show their feelings or not;

4 = child gives an elaborated and generalizable response, either situation- or relationship-oriented, with which s/he balances revealing/not revealing feelings (e.g., "I wouldn't show my feelings when people are in a bad mood. I'd show my feelings if people are in a good mood and feel like listening and talking to someone");

5 = child gives an elaborated and generalizable response about relying on own self-perception of how they feel about the feeling itself and on other-perception of how another person may evaluate the 'appropriateness' of these feelings if they are revealed. For example, "well, it would depend on how important the feeling was to me and how I'd think the people I was with would react to my showing how I really felt. Probably if I felt embarrassed about the feeling, I wouldn't show it, or I'd try to smile."

Statistical results: For the balance variable, age was a highly significant factor in an age x sex analysis of variance, $F(2,26) = 36.75$, $p < .0000$. (Age correlated $r=.74$ with the above continuum of ranked categories.) In addition, three maternal variables proved to be significant contributors to the variation in this child variable. They were in order: mother's Self-Monitoring Scale, Parent Attitude Scale, and Expressiveness subscale on the Family Environment Scale. Together, age and the three maternal variables yielded a robust $R^2=74$. It should be noted that the maternal variables obtained positive regression coefficients, in contrast to the finding for the two father variables in the regression analysis for the consequences (A) variable. Thus, mothers who espoused a more controlling attitude toward children's expressiveness, greater concern with personal self-monitoring, and the perception of their family as being high in expressiveness were more likely to have children who articulated more complex beliefs about an adaptive "balance" in showing or not showing one's feelings.

The reader is referred to Table 2 (child variable means and standard deviations by age group and sex), Table 3 (means and standard deviations for parent measures), and Table 4 (significant partial correlations between child variables and predictor variables of parent attitudes and age of child).

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Children in this age span of about 7.5 to 13.5 years clearly recognize that emotional-expressive behavior impacts on others, whether it be genuine or dissembled expressive displays. Implied in the children's thinking is the acknowledgement of social control processes: what responses are anticipated from another, followed by how self-presentation is then managed so as to influence the expected response from the other. Given such awareness of the

communicative significance of expressive displays, these children were also able to articulate (a) justifications for dissemblance, (b) both specific as well as general interpersonal consequences for dissimulated and genuine displays, (c) a personal perspective on an adaptive "balance" for when to reveal or dissemble one's feelings, and (d) who is the safer audience for seeing the genuine emotional display.

For the ordinally scaled variables, a positive relationship between increasing age and increasing complexity of thought about emotion management was anticipated and subsequently confirmed. In addition to this developmental relationship, the present data also show that parent attitudes toward their own self-monitoring, toward children's expressiveness, and their perception of expressiveness within the family may be differentially related to the level of complexity or insight their child is able to articulate about emotion management. Furthermore, mothers and fathers differed from one another in the pattern of attitudes that were related to childrens' level of articulation about emotion management.

It is not clear why children's complexity of thinking about emotion management should be differentially affected by mothers' and fathers' attitudes toward expressiveness. However, consider the following hypothetical "family" as the context in which complex thinking about emotional experience may be stimulated: Father does not particularly concern himself with monitoring his expressive behavior and is fairly permissive toward the children's emotional-expressive behavior as well. As a result, Mother perceives the family as having a rather expressive climate, and she feels that her own self-monitoring and more controlling attitude toward children's expressiveness is justified, what with all this husband-mediated expressiveness taking place. (Mother: "Somebody's got to show these kids some self-control and

social skills.") The outcome is that the children are exposed to two sets of beliefs, two sets of models, and two sets of communications about emotional-expressive behavior. The children are stimulated in their perspective-taking and reflective self-awareness and demonstrate higher-level understanding of emotional-expressive transactions as a result. In the end, it may be a chaotic household at times, what with different parental messages, but the children may get smarter quicker.

Lastly, as a result of what the children themselves have said, I think that it is clear that both the origin and the motivation to monitor and manage one's emotional expressiveness stem from one's relations with others. Even the more intrapsychic usage of personal display rules is likely to reflect past collective relations with others, which have been internalized as an audience or mirror to the self (Saarni, 1982). What intrigues me further is the notion that the very crux of our emotional experience may be altered by two processes which operate by virtue of our managing our emotional expressiveness in interpersonal contexts: (1) the neurophysiological feedback from the assorted modifications we make in our expressive behavior have an effect, and (2) the subsequent responses we receive from others about how we impact on them have another sort of effect. I will not elaborate the first process mentioned, except to say that Ekman's (1984) recent work does indicate even posed facial expressions do produce rather specific profiles or "signatures" of response in the autonomic nervous system. If one thinks of managing our expressive behavior, especially in the face, as having some resemblance to posing an expression, then we may indeed be altering our ANS, which, of course, is a pivotal component in our emotional experience.

The second emotion-altering process is the focus here. Perhaps as a result of our modification of our expressive behavior, our interactant responds

differently to us -- certainly that is the expressed hope or expectancy as articulated by the children in the present study. However, that change in the interactant's behavior also constitutes a change in the emotion-eliciting situation. If we now appraise that situation as different from before, we are also likely to feel differently. Our emotional experience is thus indeed altered, subtle or near imperceptible the emotional change may be.

Consider the following example of children's emotional experience: Blurton-Jones (1967) has noted that children, ages 3 to 4 years, were more likely to intensify their crying and general displays of distress after slightly injuring themselves in the playground when they were aware of themselves being observed as opposed to believing themselves to be unattended to. Obviously social control is evident in their exaggerating their distress in order to get some sympathetic attention (and I suspect virtually every parent can come up with an anecdote similar to Blurton-Jones' observation). The question here is what emotional changes occur for the child when he/she intensifies the display of distress in order to influence someone else? I would argue that while we simply do not know the answer to whether the ANS has been altered by the intensified display, we do have a basis for believing there to be another sort of emotional change for the children in question. The fact is that if the child gets the attention his/her intensified distress was intended to elicit, an emotional gratification has been obtained. The child's emotional experience has now been altered to include some degree of interpersonal warmth and comfort, which feels good! That emotional gratification tends to be quite reinforcing, and as a result, preschoolers become very competent at intensifying their upsetness when someone sympathetic is around. If the child is stymied in its attempt to garner some attention, an emotional change has also occurred: frustration is added to injury.

Emotional experience in interpersonal contexts becomes very dynamic indeed, and I suspect singular emotional states when around other people are very short-lived and fluidly shift with the nuances of interaction. Indeed, I would contend that children's understanding of their emotional experience goes hand in hand with their understanding of social relationships: the study of one permits the study of the other.

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TABLE 1

Sample Items from the Parent Attitude toward Children's Expressiveness Scale[a]

Item No. in Scale	Item	Scoring[b] Code
18.	If my school-age child comes home from school very angry about something the teacher has done and proceeds to slam doors, mutter dire threats, and scowl fiercely, I would:	
	a. reprimand my child for being so out of control and behaving inappropriately in the house	4
	b. ask what had happened	1
	c. tell my child that his/her behavior is disruptive	3
	d. tell my child that I just hope he/she doesn't act this way at school	2
8.	If my school-age child carelessly loses some prized (but inexpensive) possession and reacts with tears, I would:	
	a. tell them not to get so upset about it	3
	b. tell them how unhappy I am about the loss too	1
	c. remind them to be more careful next time	2
	d. say they should not feel so sorry for themselves since they were so careless in the first place	4
12.	If my school-age child has some unfounded fear (e.g., of the dark, of dogs, etc.) and gets panicy in the feared situation, I would:	
	a. reach out with a touch and assure them I was there to help	1
	b. give assurance that I was there to help but that it was time for them to realize they had no real reason to be afraid	2
	c. tell them they are being silly and will embarrass themselves someday by being so afraid	4
	d. tell them to control themselves better so that they will feel less afraid	3
9.	If my school-age child is about to appear on a local television program and inquires with visible nervousness about how many people will be watching the show, I would:	
	a. say to get control of themselves and try not to show their nervousness	3
	b. reassure and comfort my child	1
	c. suggest thinking about something relaxing so that their nervousness will not be so obvious	2
	d. tell my child to get a grip on him/herself if he/she wants a good performance	4

TABLE 1 (cont.)

Item No. in Scale	Item	Scoring Code
19.	If my school-age child is staring with interest at a woman breast-feeding her baby, I would:	
	a. permit the looking	1
	b. nudge my child and say to mind his/her own business	4
	c. ask my child what he/she is doing	2
	d. tell my child that staring is impolite	3
15.	If my school-age child wins a race in a track meet and after receiving everyone's congratulations continues to jump around gleefully and exclaim over the victory, I would:	
	a. say nothing but would begin to feel uncomfortable	2
	b. smile approvingly and offer more congratulations	1
	c. frown at the display and say that real winners do not keep "crowing"	4
	d. suggest they were over-doing it and to calm down	3
20.	If my school-age child mutters "yecchh" and grimaces when Grandma serves some of her casserole on his/her plate, I would:	
	a. remind my child to be more polite	2
	b. tell my child to apologize and shape up immediately or leave the table	4
	c. smile rather nervously and ask my child "well, what do you think it is?	1
	d. frown at my child while asking him/her to apologize for the poor manners	3

[a] The feeling state reflected in each of the above items is as follows: #18=anger, #8=distress, #12=fear, #9=anxiety, #19=curiosity, #15=happiness, #20=disgust.

[b] The scoring code represents the weights assigned to each multiple choice option, ranging from 1=most permissive to 4=most restrictive or even punitive.

Note. The complete Parent Attitude toward Children's Expressiveness Scale is available upon request from the author along with a scoring key.

TABLE 2

Mean Ratings and Standard Deviations on Justification, Consequences, and Balance Variables, According to Grade and Sex

Grade	Justification		Consequences		Balance	
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
Second: Girls	6.00	2.45	13.75	1.89	1.25	.50
Boys	5.50	2.07	13.17	1.72	1.83	.75
Fifth: Girls	7.33	1.86	15.67	1.37	4.17	.75
Boys	9.60	2.41	16.60	.89	3.60	1.14
Eighth: Girls	8.00	2.67	17.17	1.33	4.00	.63
Boys	8.40	1.82	16.80	1.92	4.00	0.00

TABLE 3

Means and Standard Deviations for Mothers and Fathers on Self-Monitoring Scale, Family Environment Scale, and Parent Attitude toward Children's Expressiveness Scale

Scale	Mothers		Fathers	
	M	SD	M	SD
Self-Monitoring Scale:	11.56	3.17	13.28	2.58
Family Environment Scale				
Expressiveness:	59.22	9.23	52.75	10.00
Independence:	43.78	11.58	49.00	8.29
Control:	50.72	10.46	54.81	7.44
Parent Attitude toward Children's Expressiveness:	39.63	4.90	42.88	4.36

TABLE 4

Summary of Significant Partial Correlations between Criterion Child Variables and Predictor Variables of Child's Age and Parent Attitudes

Predictor Variables[a]	Partial Correlation	Criterion Variable
Child's age	.45 (+)[b]	Justification
Father's SMS	.34 (+)	
Child's age	.71 (+)	Consequences
Father's SMS	.49 (-)	
Father's PACES	.44 (-)	
Child's age	.76 (+)	Balance
Mother's PACES	.43 (+)	
Mother's SMS	.43 (+)	
Mother's FES-Expressiveness	.43 (+)	

[a] Alpha set at .005 for acceptance level.

[b] The sign indicates the direction associated with the regression coefficient.